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permanent income is equalized because of changes in individuals’ relative income over time. From 
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Sammendrag 
Formålet med denne artikkelen er å utvikle metoder for måling og sammenligning av 
inntektsmobilitet. 
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1. Introduction 
"If income mobility were very high, the degree of inequality in any given year would be unimportant, 
because the distribution of lifetime income would be very even” (Krugman, 1992).  
 
It was long claimed that the US economy generates much income inequality in any given year in 
exchange for greater income mobility and therefore less permanent inequality. But several researchers 
have recently reached conclusions that appear to turn conventional wisdom on its head: Despite higher 
cross-sectional levels of inequality, Americans enjoy no more income mobility than their peers in the 
Nordic countries (e.g. Aaberge et al., 2002) and in Germany (e.g. Burkhauser and Poupure, 1997).  
 
When interpreting these findings, however, caution is in order: Following Shorrocks (1978), the above 
studies employ measures of income mobility that capture the share of cross-sectional inequality that is 
transitory.
 1
 This means that the estimated mobility is not necessarily higher in a society where 
changes in the relative incomes of individuals occur more frequently or are greater in magnitude. In 
particular, if cross-sectional inequality is low then even minor changes in relative income over time 
may translate into high income mobility. This raises the concern that traditional measures of income 
mobility do not adequately distinguish between changes in the income structure that equalize the 
cross-sectional income distribution, and those that affect individuals’ relative incomes over time. This 
concern needs to be put in context: The traditional mobility measures capture the concept they were 
designed to measure, namely the share of cross-sectional inequality that is transitory. What they do not 
capture is the widespread notion of income mobility as an equalizer of permanent income, as proposed 
by Friedman (1962) and emphasized by Krugman (1992). 
 
In this paper, we introduce a formal representation of income mobility as an equalizer of permanent 
income. The proposed representation is called a mobility curve and forms the basis for comparison of 
income distributions according to income mobility. The mobility curve captures the extent to which 
the distribution of permanent income is equalized because of changes in individuals’ relative income 
over time. The state of no mobility is defined to occur when the individuals’ positions in the cross-
sectional income distributions are constant over time. The derivative of the mobility curve allows us to 
                                                     
1 We refer to Chakravarty et al. (1985), Atkinson et al. (1992), Dardanoni (1993), Fields (2009), Gottschalk and Spolare 
(2002), Ruiz-Castillo (2004), Tsui (2009) and D’Agostino and Dardanoni (2009) for discussions of alternative approaches to 
measuring intra-generational income mobility. A number of empirical studies have employed Shorrock’s approach to 
measure income mobility, including Bjørklund, (1993), Burkhauser and Puopore (1997), Maasoumi and Trede (2001), 
Aaberge et al. (2002), Ayala and Sastre (2004), Chen (2009), and Kopczuk et al. (2009). We refer to Burkhauser and Couch 
(2009) for a recent review of the empirical literature on intra-generational income mobility. 
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directly assess the equalizing effect of income mobility in the lower, middle and upper part of the 
distribution of permanent income. 
 
The mobility curve plays a similar role in our analysis of income mobility as the Lorenz curve plays in 
analysis of income inequality. By displaying the deviation of each individual share in the distribution 
of permanent income from the share that corresponds to no income mobility, the mobility curve 
captures how changes in relative incomes over time equalize the distribution of permanent income. 
Ranking income distributions in accordance with first-degree mobility dominance means the higher of 
non-intersecting mobility curves unambiguously show more income mobility. The normative 
justification of this criterion follows from the fact that the higher of two non-intersecting mobility 
curves can be obtained from the lower mobility curve through income transfers that increase the 
frequency or magnitude of changes in relative incomes of individuals over time, while preserving the 
cross-sectional distributions of income.
 2
  
 
In practice, however, mobility curves may intersect, in which case weaker criteria than first-degree 
mobility dominance are required. To address this challenge, we introduce two alternative 
generalizations of first-degree mobility dominance; one that integrates the mobility curve from below 
(second-degree upward mobility dominance) and the other that integrates the mobility curve from 
above (second-degree downward mobility dominance). Since first-degree mobility dominance implies 
upward and downward mobility dominance of second degree, it follows that both criteria preserve 
first-degree mobility dominance. However, the transfer sensitivity of these second-degree dominance 
criteria differs. While upward mobility dominance places more emphasis on inequality in the lower 
part of the permanent income distribution, second-degree downward mobility dominance emphasizes 
on inequality in the upper part of the permanent income distribution. As a result, they complement 
each other: Downward dominance allows one to assess whether the rising share of top incomes in 
many countries is accompanied by changes in the composition of the top income classes; upward 
dominance focuses attention on whether income mobility attenuates the persistence of low income in a 
society. 
In situations where neither upward nor downward mobility dominance of second-degree provides 
unambiguous rankings of income distributions, it is useful to employ summary measures of income 
                                                     
2
 Analogously, the Lorenz curve captures the descriptive features of income inequality by displaying the deviation of each 
individual income share from the income share that corresponds to perfect equality. As shown by Atkinson (1970), ranking 
income distributions in accordance with first-degree Lorenz dominance means that the higher of non-intersecting Lorenz 
curves is preferred; the normative significance of this criterion follows from the fact that the higher of two non-intersecting 
Lorenz curves can be obtained from the lower Lorenz curve by rank-preserving income transfers from richer to poorer 
individuals. 
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mobility. Summary measures of income mobility also allow us to quantify the equalizing effect of 
income mobility. We use an axiomatic approach to derive a general family of rank-dependent 
measures of income mobility, which summarizes the informational content of the mobility curve.
 
The 
members of this family measure the extent to which the distribution of permanent income is equalized 
because of changes in relative income over time. The family is completely axiomatized, and has an 
intuitive social welfare interpretation. We also characterize the relationship between the upward and 
downward mobility dominance criteria and two parametric subfamilies of mobility measures in the 
ranking of income distributions by mobility. The subfamily associated with upward dominance is 
characterized by the principle of downside positional transfer sensitivity (Zoli, 1999; Aaberge, 2000; 
2009), while the subfamily associated with downward dominance is characterized by the principle of 
upside positional transfer sensitivity (Aaberge, 2009). The two principles differ in the sensitivity to 
inequality in the lower versus the upper part of the permanent income distribution. 
 
To illustrate the usefulness of our methods for measuring income mobility as an equalizer of 
permanent income, we exploit a population panel data set from Norway with information on 
individuals' incomes over their working life span. We also apply the methods to re-examine the pattern 
of income mobility across countries. In contrast to the conclusions reached in previous studies, we find 
that changes in relative income over time contribute more (as much) to equality in permanent income 
in the US as in the Nordic countries (Germany). 
 
Our paper complements the literature on intra-generational income mobility in several ways. The 
introduction of a mobility curve allows us to develop dominance criteria that provide partial orderings 
of income distributions according to income mobility. The mobility curve also allows us to assess the 
equalizing impact of income mobility across the entire distribution of permanent income. The 
axiomatically justified family of rank-dependent measures of income mobility provides complete 
orderings by summarizing the informational content of the mobility curve. Our representation of 
income mobility is also fundamentally different, in that we accommodate the widespread notion of 
income mobility as an equalizer of permanent income. This representation has important implications 
for the interpretation of income mobility estimates: In contrast to the traditional measures, the mobility 
curve approach ensures that high mobility will equalize permanent income and raise social welfare 
more than low mobility. Our empirical results highlight these differences: Due to low cross-sectional 
inequality in the Nordic countries, even small changes in relative incomes over time – which matter 
little for social welfare and equality in permanent income – translate into high estimates of income 
mobility when applying traditional mobility measures. 
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The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the Norwegian panel data that we 
use to illustrate the mobility curve. Section 3 presents the mobility curve and shows how it can be used 
to compare income distributions according to income mobility. Section 4 compares our methods to the 
traditional measures of income mobility, and demonstrates empirically how they reach different 
conclusions about the pattern of income mobility across countries. The final section offers some 
concluding remarks. 
2. Data  
Our empirical analysis uses a longitudinal dataset containing records for every Norwegian from 1967 
to 2010. The variables captured in this dataset include demographic information (sex, year of birth, 
municipality of birth) and socio-economic information (education and income). We focus on the 1947 
cohort, which ensures data on income from age 20 to 63.
3
 We exclude a small number of individuals 
whose information on annual income is missing. The final sample used in the analysis consists of 
51,804 individuals.  
 
Our measure of income is the sum of pre-tax market income from wages and self-employment. We 
use the consumer price index to make incomes from different years comparable (with 1960 as the base 
year). Our measure of permanent income is the annuity value of the discounted sum of real income  
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where rt denotes the real interest rates on income-transfers from year t-1 to t.
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It should be noted that the Norwegian income data have several advantages over those available in 
many other countries. First, there is no attrition from the original sample because it is not necessary to 
ask permission from individuals to access their tax records. In Norway, these records are in the public 
domain. Second, our income data pertain to all individuals, and not only to jobs covered by social 
security. Third, we have nearly career-long income histories for certain cohorts, and do not need to 
extrapolate the income profiles to ages not observed in the data. 
                                                     
3 Although the formal retirement age is 67 years, many individuals are eligible for early retirement schemes in their early 60s. 
4 The annual real interest rates is set equal to 2.3 percent. This corresponds to the average interest rate on borrowing and 
savings over the period 1967–2006. The average income is another much used measure of permanent income. This is of 
course a special case of the annuity income where the real interest rates are set equal to zero. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for annual and permanent income (1960 NOK) 
 Mean St. Dev.  St. Dev/Mean. 
Annual income:    
Age 20 58,448 61,518 1.05 
Age 30 182,139 145,757 0.80 
Age 40 
252,444 172,332 0.68 
Age 50 
288,587 231,357 0.80 
Age 60 
306,076 299,883 0.98 
Permanent income: 206,697 122,234 0.59 
 
Observations 
 
51,804 
Notes: The sample consists of individuals born 1947. Permanent income is defined as the annuitized value of real income from age 20 to 63.  
 
Table 1 displays the mean and standard deviation in annual and permanent income. Average annual 
income increases over the life cycle, and is most similar to average permanent income when individu-
als are in their mid 30s. The growth in average annual income over the life-cycle is accompanied by an 
increase in the variance of annual income. The last column shows that there is much less relative vari-
ability in the distribution of permanent income than in the cross-sectional distribution of income at any 
given age. This indicates that changes in relative incomes over time could be important as an equalizer 
of permanent income. In the next section, we introduce a framework that allows us to rigorously assess 
this conjecture. 
3. The mobility curve approach  
This section presents the mobility curve and shows how it can be used to compare income 
distributions according to income mobility. 
3.1. Mobility Curve 
To represent mobility as an equalizer of permanent income, we introduce the concept of a mobility 
curve. The mobility curve is defined as 
 
(3.1)  ( ) ( ) ( )
RZ Z
M u L u L u  ,  0,1u  
 
where LZ denote the Lorenz curve for the distribution FZ of the observed permanent income Z defined 
by (2.1); and 
RZ
L  denotes the Lorenz curve for the distribution 
RZ
F of the reference permanent 
income RZ  in the case of no mobility. In the distribution RZF , the rank of each individual is the same 
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in every period; this distribution can be formed by assigning the lowest income in every period to the 
poorest individual in period the first period, the second lowest to the second poorest, and so on.
 5
 
 
Since LZ can be attained from 
RZ
L by a sequence of Pigou-Dalton transfers in permanent income that 
keep the period-specific distributions unchanged, we have that ( ) ( )
RZ Z
L u L u  for all [0,1]u , and 
that ( ) ( )
RZ Z
L u L u  for all u if and only if Z is equal to
RZ . The mobility curve captures the extent to 
which permanent income is equalized because of changes in relative incomes over time. An equal 
distribution of permanent income can either be due to equality in the cross-sectional distributions of 
income or high income mobility. 
 
Inserting (2.1) for Z and ZR in (3.1) yields the following convenient expression,  
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 . Expression (3.2) highlights that an unequal distribution of 
permanent income (LZ) can be due to high inequality in annual income (Lt) or low mobility (M). 
 
In Figure 1, we use the income data for the 1947 cohort to graph the Lorenz curves in the distribution 
of observed annuity income and the distribution of the reference annuity income. By construction, the 
former always lies weakly above the latter, reflecting that income mobility will unambiguously 
equalize the distribution of permanent income.  
                                                     
5 Note that reference distribution that corresponds to no mobility is unique. For example, the reference permanent income 
does not depend on whether we assign incomes to individuals according to their rank in, say, the first or the last period. 
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Figure 1. Lorenz curves in the distributions of observed and reference annuity income 
 
Notes: The sample consists of individuals born 1947. Permanent income is defined as the annuitized value of real income from age 20 to 63. 
The reference annuity income represents the distribution of permanent income with no mobility. 
 
 
Figure 2 shows the mobility curve associated with the Lorenz curves in the observed and the reference 
distribution of permanent income. The derivative of the mobility curve allows us to directly assess the 
equalizing impact of income mobility across the entire distribution of permanent income. The 
derivative of M is given by 
 
(3.4)  
11 ( )( )
( ) R
R
ZZ
Z Z
F uF u
M u
 

   , [0,1].u  
 
Individuals for which M'(u) is positive (negative) become better (worse) off because of income 
mobility: Their shares of total income are higher (lower) than what they would have been in the 
absence of changes in relative incomes over time. Figure 3 displays the derivatives of the mobility 
curve for the 1947 cohort, where we represent the derivatives as the difference in income shares with 
and without mobility at every percentile. The poorest 44 percent of the population benefits from 
income mobility, at the cost of the richest 56 percent. The gains peak at the 13th percentile where 
mobility increases the share of total income by 0.29 percentage points (from .07 percent with AR to 
0.36 percent with A). There is considerable income mobility in the uppermost part of the permanent 
income distribution, reducing the share of top incomes considerably. By way of comparison, M'(u) 
would be zero for high values of u if there were no mobility in top incomes. 
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Figure 2. Mobility curve from the distributions of observed and reference annuity income 
 
Notes: The sample consists of individuals born 1947. Permanent income is defined as the annuitized value of real income from age 20 to 63. 
The reference annuity income represents the distribution of permanent income with no mobility.  
The mobility curve is defined in equation (3.2). 
Figure 3. Derivatives of the mobility curve  
 
Notes: The sample consists of individuals born 1947. Permanent income is defined as the annuitized value of real income from age 20 to 63. 
The derivative of the mobility curve is defined in equation (3.4). We represent the derivatives as the difference in income shares with and 
without mobility at every percentile.  
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3.2. Partial rankings 
Assume that 
1M  and 2M  are two mobility curves, where  1 2( ) ( ) 0,1M u M u for all u   and the 
inequality is strict for at least one 0 1u , . Then we say that 
1M  exhibits more mobility than 2M . 
Thus, ranking income distributions in accordance with first-degree mobility dominance means the 
higher of non-intersecting mobility curves unambiguously shows more income mobility.  
 
Definition 3.1. A mobility curve M1 is said to first-degree dominate a mobility curve M2 if 
  ( ) ( ) ,1 2M u M u for all u 0 1   
and the inequality holds strictly for some , .u 0 1  
 
Figure 4 shows an example of first-degree mobility dominance. In this figure, we have divided the 
1947 cohort into two subgroups according to whether the individuals were born in a rural or an urban 
municipality. We can see that the mobility curve of the individuals born in rural areas always lies 
(weakly) above that of individuals born in urban areas. Therefore, we can unambiguously conclude 
that income mobility equalizes permanent income the most in the former group.  
Figure 4. Mobility curves for individuals born in urban and rural municipalities 
   
Notes: The sample consists of individuals born 1947. Permanent income is defined as the annuitized value of real income from age 20 to 63. 
The mobility curve is defined in equation (3.2). 
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To provide a normative justification for first-degree mobility dominance, we introduce a permanent 
income version of the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers.  
 
Definition 3.2. A Pigou-Dalton permanent income transfer is a transfer in the permanent income 
distribution F from a person of rank t with income 1( )F t  to a person of rank s with income 1( )F s , 
where 0 1s t   , such that the period-specific income distributions are kept unchanged.  
 
The higher of two non-intersecting mobility curves can be obtained from the lower mobility curve by 
Pigou-Dalton permanent income transfers. Since such income transfers preserve the period-specific 
income distributions, 
RZ
L is unchanged. As a result, the dominating mobility curve M1 can be attained 
from the dominated mobility curve M2 by Pigou-Dalton permanent income transfers that equalizes the 
permanent income distribution FZ,1.
6
  
 
Theorem 3.1. Let M1 and M2 be members of M. Then the following statements are equivalent, 
(i)  ( ) ( ) ,1 2M u M u for all u 0 1   
(ii) 
1M  
can be attained from 
2M  by Pigou-Dalton permanent income transfers. 
 
The proof of Theorem 3.1 is omitted because it is analogue to the proof of the equivalence between the 
criterion of first-degree Lorenz curve dominance and the standard Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers, 
which means that the dominating Lorenz curve can be attained from the dominated Lorenz curve by 
transferring income from richer to poorer persons (Fields and Fei, 1978). 
 
In practice, however, mobility curves may intersect, in which case weaker criteria than first- 
degree mobility dominance are required. We use the mobility curve to introduce two alternative 
generalizations of first-degree mobility dominance. By integrating the mobility curve from below we 
get the criterion of second-degree upward dominance:  
 
 
 
 
                                                     
6 In practice, a Pigou-Dalton permanent income transfer is achieved by a transfer of period-specific income from a poor to a 
rich person in permanent income that increases the changes in relative incomes over time, while preserving the marginal 
distributions of period-specific incomes. 
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Definition 3.3A. A mobility curve M1 is said to second-degree upward dominate a mobility curve M2 if  
  (t) (t)
u u
1 2
0 0
M dt M dt for all u 0,1    
and the inequality holds strictly for some u 0,1 . 
 
If we instead integrate the mobility curve from above we get the criterion of second-degree downward 
dominance:  
 
Definition 3.3B. A mobility curve M1 is said to second-degree downward dominate a mobility curve M2 if  
  (t) (t)
1 1
1 2
u u
M dt M dt for all u 0,1    
and the inequality holds strictly for some u 0,1 . 
 
Figures 5 and 6 illustrate situations in which first-degree dominance is insufficient to rank income 
distributions by income mobility. Figure 5 shows mobility curves for men and women, while Figure 6 
displays mobility curves for individuals with and without a college degree. In both cases, second-
degree downward dominance is sufficient to rank these income distributions by income mobility. 
 
Since first-degree mobility dominance implies upward and downward mobility dominance of second 
degree, it follows that both criteria preserve first-degree mobility dominance and thus are consistent 
with the Pigou-Dalton principle of permanent income transfers. To judge the normative significance of 
the criteria of second-degree upward and downward mobility dominance, the next section introduces 
permanent income versions of the principles of downside and upside position transfer sensitivity.
 7
 
 
                                                     
7 Similar principles have been used by Kolm (1976a, 1976b), Zoli (1999) and Aaberge (2000, 2009) to characterize second 
degree upward Lorenz dominance, while Aaberge (2009) introduced and characterized second-degree downward Lorenz 
dominance. 
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Figure 5. Mobility curves for men and women 
  
Notes: The sample consists of individuals born 1947. Permanent income is defined as the annuitized value of real income from age 20 to 63. 
The mobility curve is defined in equation (3.2). 
 
Figure 6. Mobility curves for individuals with low and high education 
 
Notes: The sample consists of individuals born 1947. Permanent income is defined as the annuitized value of real income from age 20 to 63. 
The mobility curve is defined in equation (3.2). High (low) education is defined as (not) having a college degree. 
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3.3. Complete rankings 
In situations where neither upward nor downward mobility dominance of second-degree provides 
unambiguous rankings of income distributions, it is useful to employ summary measures of income 
mobility. Summary measures of income mobility also allow us to quantify the equalizing effect of 
income mobility. In this section, we will use an axiomatic approach to derive a general family of rank-
dependent measures of income mobility, which summarizes the informational content of the mobility 
curve.
 
 
 
Consider the ordering   defined on the family M of mobility curves. Since the mobility curve M is 
uniquely determined by two Lorenz curves, we can impose similar conditions on the ordering   as 
Aaberge (2001) used for an ordering defined on the family of Lorenz curves. That is, the ordering   is 
assumed to be transitive, continuous, complete and rank 1 2M M  if 1 2( ) ( )M u M u  for all  0,1u . 
More importantly, to give the order relation   an empirical content we introduce the following 
independence condition
8
 
 
Independence condition: Let M1, M2 and M3 be members of M and let  0 1, .  Then 1 2M M  
implies 1 3 2 3(1 ) (1 )M M M M       .  
 
It can be proved that the ordering   which satisfies these conditions can be represented by the 
following family of mobility measures 
 
(3.5)  
1
0
( ) ( ) ( ),p M p u dM u    
 
where M is the mobility curve associated with the Lorenz curves ( )ZL u  and ( )RZL u , and the weighting 
function p  is a positive non-increasing function defined on the unit interval where ( ) 1p t dt  . Note 
that the condition of non-increasing p follows from the axiom of first-degree mobility dominance. To 
ensure that p  has the unit interval as its range, the normalization 1 0p( )  is imposed.  
 
                                                     
8 These four conditions are analogue to the axioms underlying the expected utility theory for choice under uncertainty. For a 
proof of the characterization result, we refer to Fishburn (1982). 
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The preference function p assigns weights to the incomes of the individuals in accordance with their 
rank in the distribution of permanent income. Therefore, the functional form of p reveals the attitude 
towards permanent income inequality of a policymaker or researcher who employs p  to judge 
between mobility curves. Inserting for (3.1) in (3.5) yields 
 
(3.6)  
1 1
0 0
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ),
R Rp Z Z p Z p Z
M p u dL u p u dL u J L J L       
 
where the inequality measure ( )pJ L  for the Lorenz curve L of distribution F with mean µ is defined 
by  
(3.7)  
1 1
1
0 0
1
( ) 1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( )pJ L p u d L u p u F u du

     . 
Thus, the mobility measure p  shows the extent to which income mobility equalizes the distribution 
of permanent income, when inequality is measured by the rank-dependent inequality measure pJ .  
 
It is straightforward to verify that
 
0 1p( M )  , with M=0 if and only if the distribution of 
permanent income Z is equal to the distribution of the reference permanent income ZR. Thus, the state 
of no mobility occurs when each individual’s position in the period-specific income distributions is 
constant over time. Mobility takes the maximum value of one when there is complete inequality in 
each period (i.e. ( ) 1
Rp Z
J L  ) and complete equality in the distribution of permanent incomes (i.e. 
( ) 0p ZJ L  ). 
 
As demonstrated by Yaari (1988) and Aaberge (2001), the Jp-family represents a preference relation 
defined either on the class of distribution functions or on the class of Lorenz curves, where p can be 
interpreted as a preference function of a social planner. We consider both convex and concave 
preference functions. To choose between them, more powerful principles than the Pigou-Dalton 
principle of permanent income transfers are needed.  
In order to provide a formal definition of the necessary principles, it is useful to consider a 
discrete permanent income distribution. We also introduce the notation  , ,p h s  , denoting the 
18 
change in Λp of a Pigou-Dalton permanent income transfer δ from an individual with rank s+h to an 
individual with rank s in the distribution of permanent income.
9
 Further, let  
 
     , , , , , , ,p p ph r s h r h s       .  
 
We can then define the mobility principles of downside and upside positional transfer sensitivity: 
 
Definition 3.4 A. Λ satisfies the mobility principle of downside positional transfer sensitivity (DPTS)  
if and only if ( , , , ) 0p h r s    when r < s. 
 
Definition 3.4 B. Λ satisfies the mobility principle of upside positional transfer sensitivity (UPTS) if 
and only if ( , , , ) 0p h r s    when r < s. 
 
To better understand these transfer principles and how they relate to the Pigou-Dalton principle of 
permanent income transfers, consider Figure 7 where we draw the probability density f of a right-
skewed permanent income distribution F. We have also drawn two alternative Pigou-Dalton 
permanent income transfers: One from an individual at rank r+h to an individual at rank r, and another 
from rank s+h to rank s; the equal difference in rank h is reflected in the equal size of the shaded 
areas. 
 
According to the Pigou-Dalton principle of permanent income transfers, both transfers should reduce 
permanent income inequality. According to UPTS (DPTS), the transfer at lower ranks has a weaker 
(stronger) equalizing effect than the transfer at higher ranks. An inequality averse social planner that 
supports the principle of UPTS (DPTS) is therefore said to exhibit upside (downside) positional 
inequality aversion. The choice between DPTS and UPTS clarifies, therefore, whether equalizing 
transfers between poorer individuals should be considered more or less important for equality in 
permanent income as compared to equalizing transfers between richer individuals. 
                                                     
9 For convenience, the dependence of Λ on F is suppressed in the notation for Λ.  
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Figure 7. Illustration of transfer principles 
 
 
 
 
Armed with these transfer principles, we are able to characterize and interpret the relationship between 
upward and downward dominance of second degree and the general family of mobility measures Λp. 
 
Theorem 3.2A. Let M1 and M2 be members of M. Then the following statements are equivalent, 
(i) M1 second-degree upward dominates M2 
(ii)    p 1 p 2M M  for all non-increasing convex p such that (1) 0p    
(iii)    p 1 p 2M M  for all p being such that Λp obeys the principle of DPTS  
(Proof in Appendix). 
 
Theorem 3.2B. Let M1 and M2 be members of M. Then the following statements are equivalent, 
(i) M1 second-degree downward dominates M2 
(ii)    p 1 p 2M M  for all non-increasing concave p such that (0) 0p   
(iii)    p 1 p 2M M   for all p being such that Λp obeys the principle of UPTS  
(Proof in Appendix). 
 
The equivalence between (i) and (ii) in Theorem 3.2A reveals the least-restrictive set of mobility 
measures that allows an unambiguous ranking of income distributions in accordance with second-
degree upward mobility dominance. This is ensured by imposing the requirement of a convex 
preference function p. Further, the equivalence with (iii) provides a normative justification for ranking 
distribution functions according to second-degree upward mobility dominance. Theorem 3.2B 
F  ֿ
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(r)  
 
F  ֿ
1
(r+h)  
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provides analogous results for second-degree downward dominance. By comparing Theorems 3.2A 
and 3.2B, it is clear that the choice between second degree upward mobility dominance and second 
degree downward mobility dominance depends on the weight assigned to the equalizing effect of 
income mobility in the lower versus the upper part of the permanent income distribution.  
 
The transfer principles allow us to interpret the dominance results displayed in Figures 5 and 6. In both 
cases, second-degree downward dominance is sufficient to rank these income distributions by income 
mobility. We can therefore conclude that changes in relative incomes over time equalize the 
distribution of permanent income more for women and low educated individuals, provided that more 
attention is paid to inequality reduction in the upper than in the lower part of the permanent income 
distribution. If one is more concerned with inequality reduction in the lower part of the permanent 
income distribution, weaker criteria than second-degree mobility dominance is required to rank these 
distributions by income mobility. 
3.4. Social welfare interpretation 
Analogous to the expected utility type of social welfare functions proposed by Atkinson (1970), Yaari 
(1988) introduced the so-called dual family of social welfare functions defined by  
 
(3.8)  
1
1
0
( ) ( ) ( ) ,pW F p u F u du
 
 
where F is an income distribution with mean µ and associated Lorenz curve L. As was recognized by 
Ebert (1987), the social welfare function in (3.8) can alternatively be expressed as  
 
 
(3.9)   ( ) 1 ( ) ,p pW F J L 
 
 
where the product ( )pJ L  can be interpreted as a measure of the loss in social welfare due to 
inequality in the distribution F. A mean-independent ordering of income distributions in terms of 
inequality (i.e. an ordering of Lorenz curves) forms the basis of Ebert’s approach.10
  
                                                     
10 See Aaberge (2001) for a theory for ranking Lorenz curves. 
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To obtain a welfare interpretation of the income mobility measures, we rewrite expression (3.6) by 
inserting (3.9) into ( )p ZJ L  and ( )Rp ZJ L . This yields
 
 
(3.10)       1( ) ,
Rp Z p Z p Z
Z
M W F W F

    
 
where Z  and RZ  are the means of FZ and RZF  
and 
RZ Z
  . 
 
It follows from (3.10) and (3.9) that the welfare produced by the permanent income distribution FZ 
admits the following decomposition, 
 
(3.11)   ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) ,
R Rp Z p Z Z p Z p Z p
W F W F M J L M         
  
where ( )
Rp Z
W F
 
gives the level of social welfare attained when there is no mobility and ( )Z p M   
expresses the gains in social welfare due to income mobility. The last equality highlights an important 
point: If income mobility is very high, the degree of inequality in any given year will be unimportant 
for social welfare because the distribution of permanent income will be very even.
11
 Note that 
( )p Z ZW F   and that ( )p ZW F   if and only if the permanent incomes are equally distributed. Thus, 
( )p ZW F  can be given a money-metric interpretation as the equally distributed equivalent permanent 
income; this represents the level of permanent income per capita which, if shared equally, would 
generate the same social welfare as the observed distribution of permanent income.  
3.5. Parametric sub-families of mobility measures 
Until now, the results and discussion have centered on characterizing the relationship between 
dominance criteria and p in the ranking of income distributions by income mobility. This section 
extends our framework to not only answer whether one distribution has higher income mobility than 
another distribution, but also get an estimate of by how much. To this end, we employ two parametric 
sub-families of mobility measures.  
 
Consider the following parametric classes of convex and concave weighting functions, 
                                                     
11 Following the literature on income mobility, we abstract from risk due to income fluctuations over time. Incorporating the 
welfare loss from income risk would require a certainty equivalent (i.e. risk adjusted) measure of permanent income.  
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(3.12)     ( ) 1 1 , 1
k
kp u k u k    , 
and 
(3.13)  
 
  ( ) 1 1 , 1kkp u k u k    , 
 
where  1 2(1) 0 0 0k kp and p   . The weighting classes (3.12) and (3.13) define two alternative 
families of mobility measures, 
 
(3.14)    
1
1
0
1 1 1
R R
k
p ,k Z Z k Z k Z( M ) ( M ) ( k ) u d L (u ) L (u ) G ( L ) G ( L ),k            
where  
1
0
( ) 1 ( 1) 1 ( )
k
kG L k u dL u     is equal to the extended Gini family of inequality measures 
introduced by Donaldon and Weymark (1980), and 
 
(3.15)    
1
2,
0
( ) ( ) ( 1) 1 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), 1
R R
k
p k Z Z k Z k ZM M k u d L u L u D L D L k           
where  
1
0
( ) 1 ( 1) 1 ( ), 1kkD L k u dL u k      is equal to the Lorenz family of inequality measures 
introduced by Aaberge (2000, 2007).
12
  
 
Inserting for k=1 in (3.14) and (3.15), we find that both weighting functions form the following 
mobility measure, 
 
(3.16)     
1
0
( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ),
R Rp G Z Z Z Z
M M u d L u L u G L G L          
 
where G  is the Gini coefficients. Note that the p-function that corresponds to the Gini coefficient, 
 ( ) 2 1p u u  , is neither strictly concave nor strictly convex. Since ( ) 0p u   for all u, the Gini 
coefficient is the only member of p  that neither preserves second-degree upward mobility 
dominance nor second-degree downward mobility dominance. 
 
                                                     
12 Aaberge (2001) provided an axiomatic justification of these two families of inequality measures based on a theory for 
ranking Lorenz curves. 
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For k>1, however, the members of the extended Gini and Lorenz families differ in their sensitivity to 
whether changes take place in the lower or upper part of the permanent income distributions. As k 
increases, the extended Gini measures kG  assign more weight to inequality in the lower part of the 
permanent income distribution, whereas the Lorenz measures 
kD  emphasises on inequality in the 
upper part of the permanent income distribution. As k we get that 
 
(3.17)  
11
1,
(0 )(0 )
( ) R
R
ZZ
k
Z Z
FF
M
 
 
    
 
and 
 
(3.18)   2, ( ) 0k M    
 
Equation (3.17) shows that the highest degree of aversion to inequality in the lower part of the 
permanent income distribution is achieved when focus is exclusively turned to the situation of the 
poorest in the population. In this case, the social welfare function corresponds to the Rawlsian 
maximin criterion, and income mobility matters for social welfare insofar it increases the income share 
of the poorest individual. Equation (3.18) shows the other extreme situation, when focus is exclusively 
turned to the mean permanent income. In this case, any equalizing effect of income mobility does not 
matter for social welfare. 
 
 
In Table 2, we use the income data for the 1947 cohort to illustrate the parametric measures of income 
mobility. For simplicity, we focus on the case where k is equal to 1. The first column reports the Gini 
coefficients in the distribution of permanent income with no income mobility. The second column 
shows how income mobility reduces the Gini coefficients in permanent income. In the population as a 
whole, income mobility reduces the Gini-coefficient by 9.6 percentage points (or 23 percent). Put into 
perspective, this reduction corresponds to introducing a 23 percent proportional tax on permanent 
incomes and then redistributing the derived tax as equal sized amounts to the individuals (Aaberge, 
1997). This suggests that income mobility as an equalizer of permanent income can be economically 
important. The last column supports this conjecture, showing that income mobility increased social 
welfare by 12.4 percent. Table 2 also looks at income mobility within different subgroups. Consistent 
with the dominance results, we find that income mobility is relatively high among males, individuals 
with low education levels, and people born in rural areas. As a consequence, these groups experience 
the largest relative increase in social welfare.  
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Table 2. Inequality and mobility estimates 
 
Groups: 
( )
RA
G L
 
( ) ( )
RA A
G L G L
  
Increase in welfare 
due to mobility 
Males 
Females 
0.312 
0.457 
0.096 
0.135 
+ 12.2 % 
+ 19.8 % 
Rural 
Urban 
0.412 
0.417 
0.101 
0.095 
+ 14.7 % 
+ 14.0 % 
Low Education 
High Education 
0.431 
0.334 
0.097 
0.091 
+ 14.6 % 
+ 12.0 % 
Full sample 0.417 0.096 + 12.4 % 
Notes: The sample consists of individuals born 1947. High (low) education is defined as (not) having a college degree. 
4. Re-examining the pattern of income mobility 
This section compares our method to traditional measures of income mobility, and demonstrates 
empirically how they reach different conclusions about the pattern of income mobility across 
countries.  
4.1. Traditional measures of income mobility  
Following Shorrocks (1978), a large number of studies employ measures of income mobility capturing 
the share of cross-sectional inequality that is transitory. These income mobility measures are derived 
from a factor decomposition of inequality measures and can be written as 
 
( ) ( )
(4.1) ( )
( )
R
R
p Z p Z
p Z
p Z
J L J L
L
J L


 , 
 
when the rank-dependent family of inequality measures form the basis for the measurement of 
inequality. Equation (4.1) shows that ( )p ZL  is not necessarily higher in a society where changes in 
the relative incomes of individuals occur more frequently or are greater in magnitude. In particular, if 
( )
Rp Z
J L  is low then even minor changes in relative income over time may translate into high ( )p ZL . 
This raises the concern that the traditional measures of mobility does not adequately distinguish 
between changes in the income structure that equalize the cross-sectional income distributions, and 
those that affect individuals’ relative incomes over time.  
 
 
 
Inserting (3.9) for ( )p ZJ F  
and ( )
Rp Z
J F
 
in (4.1) yields the following alternative expression for p ,  
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(4.2) 
( ) ( )
( )
( )
R
R
p Z p Z
p Z
Z p Z
W F W F
L
W F





 
where the numerator of (4.2) can be considered as a measure of the gain in social welfare due to 
income mobility, and the denominator as a measure of maximum attainable gain in social welfare due 
to income mobility when ( )pW F  is used as a measure of social welfare. By rearranging equation (4.2), 
we find that ( )p ZW F  
admits the following decomposition 
(4.3) ( ) ( ) ( )( ( ))
R Rp Z p Z p Z Z p Z
W F W F L W F    . 
 
where the first term gives the level of social welfare attained when there is no mobility. The second 
term, however, is more difficult to interpret as it depends on the interaction between the cross-
sectional inequality and the income mobility. Put differently, social welfare in permanent income is 
not additively decomposable with respect to the contributions from the cross-sectional distributions 
and the income mobility. Equation (4.3) shows that even if ( )p ZL  is very high, the degree of 
inequality in any given year is important for social welfare. Therefore, ( )p ZL  is not a suitable 
measure of income mobility as an equalizer of permanent income.  
4.2. Income mobility across countries 
Consider first Table 3, which shows estimates of income mobility for the 1947 cohort. The first 
column reports the Gini coefficients in the distribution of permanent income with no income mobility. 
The second column shows the estimates of income mobility from the mobility curve approach, while 
the third displays income mobility estimates based on the traditional measures. The results suggest that 
the traditional measures of income mobility do not adequately distinguish between changes in the 
income structure that equalize the cross-sectional income distribution, and those that affect 
individuals’ relative incomes over time. As shown in the third column, the groups that have the lowest 
cross-sectional levels of inequality are always recorded with the highest income mobility when 
applying the traditional measures. This does not mean, however, that income mobility is more 
important for the distribution of permanent income for these groups. As shown in the second column, 
changes in relative incomes over time equalize permanent income the most among females, who have 
relatively high levels of cross-sectional inequality. 
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In Table 4, we re-examine the pattern of income mobility across countries. In each panel, we use the 
estimates of inequality and mobility reported in previous studies to compute our measure of income 
mobility as an equalizer of permanent income. In Panel A, we use the results reported in Aaberge et al. 
(2002) to compare income mobility between the US and the Nordic countries. We find that changes in 
relative incomes over time contribute more to equality in long-run incomes in the US than in the 
Nordic countries. However, due to low cross-sectional inequality in the Nordic countries, even small 
changes in relative incomes over time translate into high estimates of income mobility when applying 
traditional measures. 
 
In Panel B, we shift attention to the between the US and Germany. In this case, we use the results 
reported in Burkhauser and Poupure (1997). As pointed out in their study, the traditional measures 
suggest that Germany has somewhat higher income mobility than the US. This result, however, is due 
low cross-sectional levels of inequality. Changes in relative incomes over time contribute as much to 
equality in long-run incomes in the US as in Germany. 
Table 3. Inequality and mobility estimates 
Groups: ( )
RA
G L
 
( ) ( )
RA A
G L G L
 ( ) ( ) / ( )R RA A AG L G L G L
    
Males 
Females 
0.312 
0.457 
0.096 
0.135 
0.308 
0.294 
Rural 
Urban 
0.412 
0.417 
0.101 
0.095 
0.246 
0.227 
Low Education 
High Education 
0.431 
0.334 
0.097 
0.091 
0.225 
0.270 
Full sample 0.417 0.096 0.230 
Notes: The sample consists of individuals born 1947. High (low) education is defined as (not) having a college degree. 
Table 4. Estimates of mobility and inequality in permanent income 
Country and period: G(ZR) G(ZR)- G(Z) [G(ZR)- G(Z)]/ G(ZR) 
Panel A:    
Denmark, 80-90 0.239 0.019 0.080 
Norway, 80-90 0.275 0.019 0.069 
Sweden, 80-90 0.252 0.018 0.073 
U.S., 80-90 0.404 0.026 0.065 
    
Panel B:    
Germany, 83-88 0.240 0.015 0.065 
U.S., 83-88 0.340 0.016 0.048 
    
Notes: In Panel A, the estimates of columns 1 and 3 are from Aaberge et al. (2002). In Panel B, the estimates of columns 1 and 3 are from 
Burkhauser and Poupure (1997).  
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5. Concluding remarks 
Do market-orientated economies with relatively large cross-sectional levels of inequality have higher 
income mobility and therefore less permanent inequality? To answer this question, we have introduced 
a formal representation of the notion of income mobility as an equalizer of permanent income. The 
proposed representation is called a mobility curve and forms the basis for comparison of income 
distributions according to income mobility. The mobility curve captures the extent to which the 
distribution of permanent income is equalized because of changes in individuals’ relative income over 
time. We applied our method to re-examine the conclusions in recent studies about the pattern of 
income mobility across countries. We find that changes in relative income over time contribute more 
(as much) to equality in permanent income in the US as in the Nordic countries and Germany. 
 
Our paper complements the literature on intra-generational income mobility in several ways. The 
introduction of a mobility curve allows us to develop dominance criteria providing partial orderings of 
income distributions according to income mobility. The mobility curve also allows us to assess the 
equalizing impact of income mobility across the entire distribution of permanent income. An 
axiomatically justified family of rank-dependent measures of income mobility provides complete 
orderings by summarizing the informational content of the mobility curve. Our representation of 
income mobility is also fundamentally different, in that we accommodate the widespread notion of 
income mobility as an equalizer of permanent income. This representation has important implications 
for the interpretation of our income mobility estimates: High mobility will equalize permanent income 
and raise social welfare more than low mobility. Our empirical results highlight these differences: Due 
to low cross-sectional inequality in the Nordic countries, even small changes in relative incomes over 
time – which matter little for social welfare and equality in permanent income – translate into high 
estimates of income mobility when applying traditional mobility measures. 
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Appendix: Proofs 
Proof of Theorem 3.2A. Using integration by parts we have that 
 
   
   
1 1
1 2 1 2 1 2
0 0
1 1
1 2 1 2
0 0 0
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
(1) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
p p
u
M M p u d M u M u p u M u M u du
p M t M t dt p u M t M t dtdu
      
     
 
  
 
Thus, if (i) holds then 1 2( ) ( )p pM M   for all non-increasing convex p such that (1) 0p  .  
 To prove the converse statement we restrict to non-increasing convex p such 
that (1) 0p  .. Hence, 
  
1
1 2 1 2
0 0
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
u
p pM M p u M t M t dtdu       
and the desired result it obtained by applying Lemma 1 (see below). 
 
To prove the equivalence between (ii) and (iii) consider a case where we transfer a small amount  
from persons with permanent incomes  1 1F s h
   and  1 1F t h
   to persons with permanent 
incomes 1( )F s  and 1( )F t , respectively, where t is assumed to be larger than s. Then Λp defined by 
(3.5) obeys DPTS if and only if 
    1 1( ) ( )p r p r h p s p s h      
which for small h1 is equivalent to 
 ( ) ( ) 0p s p r   . 
Next, inserting for 2s r h  , we find, for small h2, that this is equivalent to ( ) 0p s  . 
 
Proof of Theorem 3.2B.  
The proof of Theorem 3.2B is analogue to the proof of Theorem 2.2A and is based on the expression 
    
1 1 1
1 2 1 2 1 2
0 0
( ) ( ) (0) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )p p
u
M M p M t M t dt p u M t M t dtdu           , 
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which is obtained by using integration by parts. Thus, by arguments like those in the proof of Theorem 
3.2A the results of Theorem 3.2B are obtained. 
 
Lemma 1. Let H be the family of bounded, continuous and non-negative functions on [0,1] which are 
positive on 0,1 and let g be an arbitrary bounded and continuous function on [0,1]. Then 
   g(t)h(t) dt 0 for all h H  
implies 
  g(t) 0 for all t 0,1   
and the inequality holds strictly for at least one t 0 1 , .  
 
The proof of Lemma 1 is known from mathematical textbooks. 
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